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Kennan: The Role of International Human Rights Law in Australian Law

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN AUSTRALIAN LAW
Jim Kennan S.C.*
I. THE ABSENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Australia does not have national legislation embracing a Bill of
Rights or a Charter of Rights, although the Australian Government has
currently sponsored a public consultation on whether a Charter should
be adopted. There have been attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to
introduce national human rights legislation but these did not succeed.
However, a Charter of Rights has been passed in the Australian Capital
Territory, and in the State of Victoria. These acts apply only to those
jurisdictions. They are similar in operation to the Human Rights Act of
1998 of the United Kingdom. The rights in this Act are based on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Australia signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”) in 1981. It has also signed the Convention on Torture.
However, the Australian courts have shown little interest in developing
Australian law by reference to the international charter, but have rather
preferred to operate within the existing confines of the common law.
In the case of statutory interpretation, it has been a recognised
principle in Australia that as a rule of construction, the legislature is not
to be taken to have intended to legislate in violation of the rules of
international law existing when the legislation was enacted. Therefore, it
is the principle of statutory construction that statutes are to be read
consistently with the rules of international law, but not where the clear
words of the statute are inconsistent with that implication.1 However,
the courts have not generally adopted the principles contained in
international treaties in the development of the common law.2
In one of the few positive references by the High Court of Australia
to the ICCPR, Justice Brennan3 said that the Court could take into
account the fact of the adherence by Australia to the ICCPR as an
expression of community values. That case concerned the right of an
accused person to be provided with legal counsel at public expense. The
High Court held that the law of Australia did not recognise such a right,
but that if a person was denied legal aid, then the court had the power to
stay the trial until legal aid was provided if the trial was not going to be
*

Jim Kennan S.C., LLB (Hons) (Melb); LLM (Melb).
See Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, 589–90.
2
Ragg v. Magis. Ct. 179 A. Crim. R. 568, 18 V.R. 300 (Vict. 2008) (the approach of Bell, J.
in this case has not been adopted elsewhere).
3
Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 9 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
1
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fair in the absence of legal representation. Justice Brennan referred to
article 14(3)(d) as a concrete indication of contemporary values and
referred to the fact that that article provided a right to have legal
assistance.4 The Judge also referred to the covenant as being a legitimate
influence on the development of the common law of Australia, although
it was not part of Australian domestic law.5
It may be said, however, that these references to the international
law are the exception rather than the rule in Australia. The Australian
courts have preferred to be guided by the general common law principle
that a trial must be fair rather than by reference to the specific provisions
of the International Covenant, or relevant international jurisprudence
which interprets the ICCPR or its European equivalent, the European
Convention.
A. The High Court Upholds Lifetime Detention of an Illegal Immigrant
In Al Kateb, the High Court held that the Migration Act of Australia
authorised the detention of a non-citizen who had entered Australia
illegally, even if his removal from Australia was not reasonably
practicable in the foreseeable future, and that he might spend the rest of
his natural life in prison.6 Only one justice (Kirby, J.) referred in positive
terms to the operation of international law, to hold that such a
construction was wrong.7 Justice McHugh, who was in the majority and
who argued against the application of international law, did suggest the
outcome might have been different if Australia had a Bill of Rights.8
B. The Experience of the Australian and English Courts in the Terrorist Cases
An examination of the way in which courts in Australia have dealt
with counter terrorist legislation, and the way in which courts in
England have dealt with similar issues, is instructive in understanding
the differences in legal cultures where one jurisdiction acknowledges
international treaties in the development of the domestic law, and
another jurisdiction pays only peripheral attention to them. It is also the
case that since 1998 the United Kingdom has had the Human Rights
Act,9 while Australia has none.

4
5
6
7
8
9
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Id.
Id. (citing Mabo v. Queensland [No.2], (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 41).
(2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, 1 (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.).
Id. at 150, 175, 179 (opinion of Kirby, J.).
Id. at 73 (opinion of McHugh, J.).
Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).

Kennan: The Role of International Human Rights Law in Australian Law

2010]

Role in Australian Law

897

C. The Right to a Fair Trial
In Benbrika, the court was faced with a trial of twelve persons
accused with offences under the Australian terrorist legislation.10 The
trial was scheduled to take between six and nine months.11 The accused
had been in custody for almost two years when the trial started in
February 2008.12 During this time they had been held in the most austere
conditions in the prison system, including being held up to twenty-three
hours per day in their cells, with very severe restrictions on receiving
visitors.13
The accused had been held at a maximum security prison some
distance from the court in Melbourne.14 The travelling time, depending
on the traffic, to and from court was between sixty-five to eighty minutes
each way.15 The accused were strip searched when they left the prison in
the morning and again each evening.16 The process of loading them in
the morning, including the strip searching, took about an hour in
addition to the travel time.17 The accused were handcuffed and shackled
during their travel to and from the court.18 At the end of the day, they
were subject to the same routine.19
Evidence was called from medical practitioners to the effect that the
impact on the physical and psychological functioning of someone
subjected to this regime was that it would have a significant impact on
memory and concentration, and that it would compromise significantly
the capacity of the ordinary person to attend to the complex material
being presented at the trial, as well as hinder the person in assisting in
his defence.20
The Judge in the case said that he was satisfied on the evidence that
the accused were currently being subjected to an unfair trial because of
these circumstances.21 He ordered that the accused be moved to a prison
in close proximity to the court, and that the strip searching and shackling
stop.22 In doing so the judge relied on the common law principles that a
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

R. v. Benbrika (2008) 182 A. Crim. R. 205.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28–31.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 47–67.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 99–102.
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trial must be fair and the power of a court to order a stay of proceedings
unless the unfairness was remedied.23
The Judge said that the case could be resolved by the application of
common law principles, without referring to international instruments,
although the ICCPR and a number of European cases were referred to in
argument.24 The interesting point to note is that none of the common
law cases expressly dealt with the sort of factual situation that
confronted the court in this case.25 The principles of the common law
that referred to the right to a fair trial and the power of the court to order
a stay if unfairness persisted were sufficient to determine the case.26 It
should be said that this is a landmark decision in the Australian common
law, but that if international legal principles, such as equality of arms,
were more generally recognised in Australia, and Australian courts had
regard to international jurisprudence, then it might not have taken until
2008 for such a decision to be given, or for such an argument to be
agitated.
In contrast to the silence of the common law in Australia (prior to
Benbrika) on the impact of prison conditions on the capacity of the
accused to participate in his trial, there were European cases which dealt
with the issue as to whether or not the conditions in which accused
persons were held were such that the accused could not properly
participate in the trial. In particular, the case of E v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department set out the following principles:27
• The right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of the rule of
law.
• The principle of equality of arms requires that each party be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under
conditions that could not place him at a substantial
disadvantage.
• The right of an accused person to effectively participate in a
criminal trial includes the right to hear and follow the
proceedings.
• It is a breach of the principle of fairness if the conditions of
detention and transportation are such that the accused suffers
from low physical and mental resistance.
• It is important that the accused be able to participate in the trial
without being in a state of excessive tiredness.
23
24
25
26
27
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Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 15–20.
Id. at 15.
Id.
E. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (2007) E.W.H.C. 1731 (Q.B.D. Admin).
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•

The question of whether or not the conditions of the trial meet
the required standards of fairness is a matter for the trial judge.
This case is an example of how an English court readily felt able to
embrace the International Law concept of equality of arms, in order to
develop the common law in England.28 The notion of equality of arms is
not readily embraced by the Australian common law.29
II. TORTURE CASES – DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH
In the case of Thomas, the Victorian Court of Appeal dealt with the
case of an accused person who had been convicted of receiving funds
from a terrorist organization.30 He had been interviewed by Australian
police in Pakistan while he was effectively in the custody of Pakistani
officials.31 The Court found that he had been told repeatedly by his
Pakistani interrogators that his fate would depend to a very substantial
extent on the degree to which he cooperated.32 The Pakistani officials
had told him that he did have the possibility on the one hand of
returning to his family in Australia, and on the other hand a very
different fate.33 They told him that the Australian authorities would only
be able to assist him if he could be seen to have cooperated fully.34
The Australian officials did nothing to distance themselves from that
position.35 The Court also found that he had been emotionally
manipulated by the Australian police who showed him a photograph of
his wife and daughter, and a letter from his wife.36 The Court found that
he had been effectively threatened with indeterminate detention by the
Pakistanis, in Pakistan or in some other unidentified location.37 He was
held in a house for about two weeks in a cell the size of a dog kennel and
was deprived of food and water for about three days.38 He was
questioned in a room sitting on a low stool with his feet padlocked to a
large metal plate on the floor, and he was handcuffed behind his back.39
At one stage a Pakistani officer grabbed his hood by the collar and
Id. at 21–22, 60–62.
But see Ragg v. Magis. Ct., (2008) 179 A. Crim. R. 568, 18 V.R. 300 (Vict.) (addressing
equality of arms in depth).
30
R. v. Thomas III (2006) 181 A. Crim. R. 323, 1.
31
Id. at 2.
32
R. v. Thomas (2006) 163 A. Crim. R. 567, 71, [2006] V.S.C.A. 165.
33
Id. at 74.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 76–78.
37
Id. at 80.
38
Id. at 12–15.
39
Id.
28
29
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strangled him so that he was suffocating, and he felt unbearable heat and
stress.40 After this he was not allowed water.41 He had given evidence
that he believed that he may be sent to Guantánamo Bay if he did not
cooperate.42
A. The Reluctance of Australian Judges to Refer to International Norms and
Treaties
The treatment of Thomas would, on the face of it, amount to torture
or cruel or degrading and inhuman treatment within the meaning of the
Torture Convention43, and within the meaning of Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.44 However, the Victorian Court of Appeal made no
reference to any international treaties in its judgment, and ruled that the
record of interview was inadmissible according to common law
principles because it could not be said to be voluntary.45 Nor did either
of the other two judges who dealt with the case at the initial trial and on
the retrial refer to international treaties when considering the
circumstances of Thomas’s treatment in Pakistan. The reluctance of
Australian judges to refer to international law when dealing with a case
of this kind stands in stark contrast to the approach taken in the United
Kingdom.
B. The Contrasting Position in England—The Cases of A and Binyam
Mohamed
The difference in legal cultures is highlighted by reference to two
English cases. In A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2), the
House of Lords was concerned with a case where the appellants
appealed against a decision on the basis that their evidence before the
immigration appeals commission might have been procured by torture
inflicted by foreign nationals.46 The House of Lords held that the English
common law had always set its mind firmly against the use of torture

Id. at 15.
Id.
42
Id. at 10.
43
See G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), Art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/2433 (Dec. 9, 1975) (defining torture).
Torture is defined in Article 1 of the Convention to mean: “any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . . on a person for such
purposes as obtaining [information] from him.” Id.
44
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
45
R. v. Thomas (2006) 163 A. Crim. R. 567, at 91–94.
46
A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No. 2) [2006] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221
(appeal taken from Eng.).
40
41
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and had insisted that evidence so obtained was to be excluded.47 The
Court had regard to the European Convention48 and the International
Convention Against Torture, 1984.49 It said that the international
prohibition on the use of torture enjoyed the status of a peremptory
norm of international law.50
In the case of Binyam Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, the Queens Bench division of the High Court in
England, consisting of two judges, dealt with the case of a detainee at
Guantánamo.51 The detainee said that he had been the subject of
extraordinary rendition and had been tortured before his removal to
Guantánamo.52 The proceedings in the High Court in England were
directed to obtaining discovery from the intelligence agencies in
England, as to what they knew of his treatment, as it had appeared that
British agents had some involvement in his interrogation by Pakistani
authorities and may have some knowledge of his rendition by the United
States agencies.53 In the course of its judgment, which ordered the
disclosure of information held by the British government, the Court
made a number of important observations:
• The common law had long set its face against torture.54
• Equally significant was the fact that the prohibition on state
torture had achieved the status of a peremptory norm in
international law (the Court referred to the Convention against
Torture 1984).55
• The Court gave weight to Article 5 of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits torture
or cruel inhumane and degrading treatment, Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention, which prohibits cruel treatment and
torture, and other Articles of the conventions which prohibited
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, and Article 16 of the Convention Against

Id. at 11 (opinion of Bingham, L.J.).
Id. at 23–26 (citing European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, as amended by Protocol 11, E.T.S. 155 (1998)).
49
Id. (citing Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984)).
50
Id. at 33.
51
Binyam Mohamed v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008]
EWHC 2048 (Q.B). This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal of England and
Wales on 10the February 2010. See [2010] EWCA Civ 65.
52
Id. at 35–38.
53
Id. at 60–145.
54
Id. at 142(i).
55
Id. at 142(ii).
47
48
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Torture which prohibits cruel inhuman or degrading
treatment.56
The Court also held that the United Kingdom Government had
facilitated the interrogation of the appellant at a time when it knew of his
treatment in Pakistan, including being held incommunicado and without
access to a lawyer.57 Such detention was unlawful under the law of
Pakistan.58 The Court adopted what had been said in the Horseferry Road
Magistrates Court case.
There is . . . no principle more basic to any proper
system of law than the maintenance of the rule of law
itself. When it is shown that the law enforcement
agency responsible for bringing a prosecution has only
been enabled to do so by participating in violations of
international law and of the laws of another state in
order to secure the presence of the accused within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, I think that respect for
the rule of law demands that the court take cognisance
of that circumstance. To hold that the court may turn a
blind eye to executive lawlessness beyond the frontiers
of its own jurisdiction is, to my mind, an insular and
unacceptable view.59
It should be noted that this judgment was delivered some time before the
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, in the United Kingdom. The
English courts had been paying much more attention to international
law in the development of the common law, than the Australian courts
did, even well before the enactment of the human rights legislation in the
United Kingdom.
C. The Control Order Cases
In another case concerning Thomas, Thomas v. Mowbray, a
constitutional challenge was launched in the High Court of Australia, to
the validity of a control order which had been made under the
counterterrorism legislation in respect to Thomas.60 The Court upheld
by a majority the validity of the control order legislation on the basis that
Id. at 143.
Id. at 147(vi).
58
Id.
59
Id. (citing R v. Horseferry Rd. Magis. Ct. [1994] 1 A.C. 42 (on appeal from Q.B.)
(opinion of Bridge, L.J.)).
60
Thomas v. Mowbray (2007) 233 C.L.R. 307, 81 A.C.J.R. 1414 (Austl.).
56
57
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the legislation was within the defence power of the Australian
government to protect the nation against aggression from within the
country, as well as from without,61 and that the conferral of the power to
make a control order on the judiciary was one that was consistent with
judicial activities.62 No reference was made to international treaties or
the ICCPR by the majority in this case.
There have been a number of decisions of the House of Lords on the
issue of control orders. Those decisions have different outcomes, but all
involved consideration of the right to liberty under Article 5 of the
European Convention.63
D. Deference—The Belmarsh Case
By way of further contrast, the Belmarsh case decided by the House
of Lords in 2004 showed a robust attitude to the interpretation of counter
terrorism legislation by a court utilising the Human Rights Act 1998 and
extensive reference to the European Convention and international law.64
In that case, the appellants were foreign nationals who were
detained under the Terrorism Act in the United Kingdom. The
Terrorism Act empowered the Secretary of State to issue a certificate in
respect of foreign nationals whom he reasonably suspected of being
terrorists or having links with international terrorist groups, and whom
he reasonably believed to be a threat to national security.65 A person so
certified could be detained under immigration legislation pending his
removal from the United Kingdom even if such removal was impossible
because of the effect of an international agreement, or for practical
reasons.66 Such a person could, however, agree to leave United
Kingdom voluntarily.
The Act did not apply to British nationals.67 The United Kingdom
had formally notified the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that
it found it necessary to take measures in derogation of Article 5 of the
European Convention on Human Rights on the grounds that there was a
public emergency threatening the life of the nation.68
Id. at 132–40, 154.
Id. at 121.
63
See Adam Sandell, Liberty, Fairness, and the UK Control Order Cases: Two Steps Forward,
Two Steps Back,, 2008 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 120 (analyzing the right to liberty).
64
A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
65
Id. at 12 (opinion of Bingham, L.J.) (citing Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act,
2001, § 21).
66
Id. at 13 (citing Anti-Terrorism Act § 22(1)), 14 (citing Anti-Terrorism Act § 23).
67
Id. at 33–34.
68
Id. at 10.
61
62
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The appeal was brought on the grounds that there was no public
emergency, that the measures were not proportionate, and that they
were discriminated against on the grounds of nationality or immigration
status.69
1.

Judicial Deference Did Not Preclude Court Review of the Executive
Decision

The House of Lords held by majority that it was appropriate for the
courts to give weight to the political judgments of the government and
the Parliament on the question of whether or not there was a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation.70 However, it held that
judicial deference did not preclude the courts from reviewing the
compatibility of the measures, with the requirements of the European
Convention including proportionality.71
It held that since other measures were adequate to monitor the
activities of British suspects, it was hard to see why a regime of strict
restrictions and intensive monitoring would not suffice in the case of
foreign nationals.72 The court said that the measure failed to adequately
address the problem and at the same time involved the severe penalty of
indefinite detention of persons who, even if suspected of having links to
a terrorist organisation, might have harboured no hostile intention
towards the United Kingdom. Since the risk to security emanated from
both British and foreign nationals, the difference in treatment could not
be justified.73
There was no authority to support the proposition that in times of
emergency, the State may lawfully discriminate against foreign nationals
by detaining them while not detaining those of its own nationals who
pose the same threat.74
The measures involved unjustifiable
discrimination on the ground of nationality or immigration status,
contrary to Article 14 of the European Convention and Article 26 of the
ICCPR.75 The United Kingdom had not sought to derogate from these
articles. The measures also failed to meet the third requirement of
Article 15 of the European Convention since they were inconsistent with
the United Kingdom’s other obligations under international law.76
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
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Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 38–42.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 69, 73.
Id.
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A Landmark Decision
This decision has been said by Lady Mary Arden to be:
[A] landmark decision that will be used as a point of
reference by courts all over the world for decades to
come, even when the age of terrorism has passed. It is a
powerful statement by the highest court in the land of
what it means to live in a society where the executive is
subject to the rule of law.77

3.

The Observations on Deference

On the question of the deference by the courts to political authorities
Lord Bingham said this:
[I] do not accept the full breadth of the Attorney
General's argument on what is generally called the
deference owed by the courts to the political authorities.
It is perhaps preferable to approach this question as one
of demarcation of functions . . . . The more purely
political . . . a question is, the more appropriate it will be
for political resolution and the less likely it is to be an
appropriate matter for judicial decision. The smaller,
therefore, will be the potential role of the court. It is the
function of political and not judicial bodies to resolve
political questions. Conversely, the greater the legal
content of any issue, the greater the potential role of
court, because under our Constitution and subject to the
sovereign power of Parliament it is the function of the
courts and not of political bodies to resolve legal
questions. The present question seems to me to be very
much at the political end of the spectrum.78
It may be noted that on the question of deference, Lord Hoffman had
a different view. He referred to the widespread scepticism “which has
attached to intelligence assessments since the fiasco over Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction . . . .”79 But he said he was willing to accept that

Mary Arden Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism, 121 L.Q. REV. 604, 621-22 (2005).
A. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, 29 [2005] 2 AC 68 (opinion of
Bingham, L.J.).
79
Id. at 94.
77
78
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there was credible evidence that plots for terrorist outrages existed.80
However, he said that the question was whether there was a threat to the
life of the nation.81 He went on to say that:
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity,
which has survived physical destruction, and
catastrophic loss of life . . . . The Spanish people have
not said that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime
as it was, threatened the life of their nation. Their
legendary pride would not allow it. Terrorist violence,
serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of
government or our existence as a civil community.82
He then stated that:
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of the
people living in accordance with its traditional laws and
political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws
such as these. That is the true measure of what
terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide
whether to give the terrorists such a victory.83
Lord Scott said, on the question of deference:
It is certainly true that the judiciary must in general
defer to the executive's assessment of what constitutes a
threat to national security or to “the life of the nation”.
But judicial memories are no shorter than those of the
public and the public have not forgotten the faulty
intelligence assessments on the basis of which United
Kingdom forces were sent to take part, and are still
taking part, in the hostilities in Iraq . . . . I do have very
great doubt whether the “public emergency” is one that
justifies the description of “threatening the life of the
nation”. None the less. I would . . . be prepared to allow
the Secretary of State the benefit of the doubt on this
point . . . .84

80
81
82
83
84
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Id.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 154 (opinion of Scott, L.J.).
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A Slippery Slope

Lord Steyn, in a paper on deference, has said that “it cannot be right
to say that these are issues which constitutional principle withdraws
from the decision by the courts.”85 He went on to point out that the
argument in times of emergency, the notion that “we are all on the same
side as the government,” is a slippery slope which tends to sap the will
of the judiciary to stand up to a government guilty of an abuse of
power.86 Principles developed by the courts for extreme situations are
likely to outlast those situations and be applied in normal times as well.
E. The Approach of the Supreme Court of India
In India (a country which has witnessed terrorist acts within its
borders for fifty years) the Supreme Court has said this about terrorist
cases:
Terrorist acts are meant to destabilize the nation by
challenging its sovereignty and integrity . . . .
The
protection and promotion of human rights under the
rule of law is essential in the prevention of terrorism . . . .
If human rights are violated in the process of combating
terrorism, it will be self defeating . . . . To maintain this
delicate balance by protecting core human rights is the
responsibility of the courts[.]87
III. THE COMMON LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Lord Steyn has also argued that in the United Kingdom prior to the
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, fundamental rights of
individuals had not been adequately protected in the legal system.88 He
argued that a constitutional democracy must protect fundamental rights.
He said that “[w]ithout such a moral compass the state is bound to treat
individuals arbitrarily and unjustly . . . . By the 1998 Act Parliament
made the judiciary the guardians of the ethical values of our Bill of
Rights.”89 He said that the profound change in the legal system was

Lord Steyn, Deference: A Tangled Story, PUB. L. 346, 355 (2005).
Id. at 359.
87
[2003] SOL Case No 840.
88
Lord Steyn, Laying the Foundations of Human Rights Law in the United Kingdom, 2005
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emphasised by the decision of the House of Lords in the Belmarsh case.
He referred in particular to what Lord Bingham said:
I do not in particular accept the distinction . . . between
democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course
true that the judges in this country are not elected and
are not answerable to Parliament. It is also of course
true . . . that Parliament, the executive, and the courts
have different functions.
But the function of
independent judges charged to interpret and apply the
law is universally recognized as a cardinal feature of the
modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of
law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist
on the proper limits of judicial authority, but he is
wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in some
way undemocratic . . . . The 1998 Act gives the courts a
very specific, wholly democratic mandate . . . .90
If Lord Steyn is correct in saying that human rights were not
adequately protected in the United Kingdom before the 1998 Human
Rights Act, when only the common law applied, then the same is true of
Australia today. It is a common law system, with a common law that is
very close to that of the United Kingdom, prior to the introduction of the
Human Rights Act.
There has been much written on the adequacy or otherwise of the
response of the English courts to the counter terrorist legislation, and
whether or not the Human Rights Act in England provides adequate
protection of human rights in the age of terror.91
A. The Approach of the English Courts is Much Stronger on Human Rights
Than the Australian Courts
My purpose in referring to these English decisions is not to provide
an exhaustive analysis of those decisions and many other related
decisions. Rather, my purpose is to draw a distinction between the way
in which a legal culture informed by domestic human rights legislation,
and where the courts embrace international law, deals with these issues,
Id. at 350.
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in comparison with the situation in Australia where there is no domestic
human rights legislation, and where the courts only treat international
law as relevant at the margin, if at all.
As a practitioner in the field in Australia, having been involved to a
greater or lesser extent in three different terrorist cases, I can only say
that I would have much preferred to have been arguing those cases in
the English context rather than the Australian context.
B. The Unprecedented Decision to Order a Retrial in Thomas, on the Basis of
the Prosecution Seeking to Introduce New Evidence
In this context it should be noted that in Thomas III, the Victorian
Court of Appeal ordered a retrial at the request of the prosecution, on the
basis of new evidence in the form of a television interview recorded
before the first trial, but aired after the conclusion of that trial.92 There
was no precedent for ordering a new trial at the request of the
prosecution on the basis of new evidence, in the United Kingdom, or
Australia, or Hong Kong, or in the United States. I doubt whether it
would have been ordered by an English court. It was a dramatic
departure from established principle and a departure in favour of the
prosecution. The Court itself acknowledged that its decision was
without precedent.
C. Domestic Human Rights Legislation is Needed in Australia
In the Thomas case, the jury acquitted Thomas on his retrial. This
was a sign that the jury was able to stand back from the war on terror
rhetoric which has so dominated public discussion since 2001, and forms
a view about the evidence, or lack of it, presented in court.
But the Australian system would be significantly enhanced by
domestic human rights legislation and by the Australian courts
abandoning their insular view of the world, and embracing international
human rights law.
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